Threats to Nationhood

Published on January 21, 2026

Nigeria‟s independence was not fought with guns and war machines, against the tradition of other former colonies of Britain where they wrestled their way to independence with the last drop of their blood, such as Republic of Ireland. The nationalist‟s drive for self-government was only temporarily hampered by internal resistance from the Northern region of the country which was ill-prepared for self-determination in 1959. The nationalist movement for independence, nevertheless, became a reality in 1960 despite the reservations of the Northern region.

Expectedly, several consequences became apparent and have played divisive role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the nation. A brief walk down memory lane reveals the overt disaffection and tacit rejection that greeted the amalgamation by the regional leaders.
From the Southern front, the 1914 amalgamation ignited a row of anti-northern sentiments across the region. The south was simply apprehensive of amalgamation and did not see any compatibility between the North and the South. The Times of Nigeria newspaper saw the amalgamation as synonymous with subjugation of southern Nigeria:
“…the conquest and subjugation of southern Nigeria by northern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria system, Northern law, as Northern Nigeria administration must be made to supersede every system in southern Nigeria” (Kirk-Green, 1968: 22).

The Nigerian Chronicle of 23 January 1914 described the amalgamation as “a union of names” as opposed to a union of customs, manners and cultures. It added that the amalgamation was a proposed installation of mental slavery. This notion rode on the back of disdain for the Indirect Rule System of the North, based mainly on the Emirate system, especially in the Eastern Region where the Native Authority was introduced and later rejected in 1949. There was a wide belief in the South that amalgamation provided the excuse to transplant the infamous conservative and essentially Islamic system to the South.

Obafemi Owolowo, an early nationalist Yoruba leader and that of the Action Group and former Premier of the Western Region referred to the amalgamation and merger of 1914 as a “mere geographical expression” (Kirk-Green, 1968: 1).
There is nothing to show that Owolowo had any respect for the amalgamation. If he had any difficulties, it must have arisen from the cultural and religio-political incompatibility imposed by the amalgamation, and the supposed excess baggage of going with the North. Thus, in 1953, Awolowo, leading the Yoruba, threatened to pull Western Nigeria out of the Nigerian Federation if Lagos was cut from Western Region.

From the Northern front, the Sardauna of Sokoto and former Premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello, saw the amalgamation as “the mistake of 1914” (Bello, 1962); this implied that he and his apologists would have preferred the North to remain as it was before the amalgamation. The chief gain would have been a wholesome preservation of the proud Islamic past of the Sokoto caliphate which the British had met on arrival.

The North did not come with a coherent reaction to the amalgamation, mainly because it lacked a developed Western educated elite corps and press to articulate this as it was the case in the south. Its views were largely aired by the northern emirs, including the Sultan of Sokoto, who provided leadership at the time. The Indirect Rule System shielded the North's institutions from the adverse effects of the amalgamation. In the North, voices were heard expressing resentment at the way the amalgamation dislocated it from its proud Islamic past, geographically, administratively and culturally. 1914 has been criticized as an act of folly that has brought little but ruin to the North (Kirk-Green, 1968: 27)

During the 1950 constitutional conference held to review the Richard‟s constitution, the Emirs of Kano and Katsina demanded 50 percent of the seats in the proposed House of Representatives and threatened to secede and return to pre-1914 arrangement if this was not granted, buttressing the fact that the loyalty of the North, decades after the amalgamation, was to Kaduna and not to the national capital in Lagos.
By the time the constitutional crisis of 1953, and later the political fracas leading to and culminating in the coup of January 1966, the North had resented the South and blamed the 1914 amalgamation for its woes and for dislocating its proud Islamic past.
Here lies the foundational problems that have militated against the maturation of the country into a formidable nation state that will usher in a world our country men and women yearn to behold for decades. As a resultant consequence, poverty, malnutrition, unemployment, instability, youth restiveness and near collapse of the security architecture have brought the country to its knees. It is a fact beyond contradiction that to understand the present, a lucid understanding of the past is crucial; and to predict or determine the future, the present must be fully grasped. This is due to the overbearing influence of the past on the present and that of the present on the future. However, the African continent and Nigeria in particular seem to have remained fixated in its colonial past. Consequently, the country has been submerged in ethnic hostilities, religious bigotry and sectional divide, thus making the centre too weak to hold the component units.
The independence of Nigeria on 1st October 1960 restored hope in many Nigerians in particular and Africans in general about the future of the continent. It was expected that Nigeria as a sovereign nation will blaze the trail in the economic emancipation and advancement of the entire African continent, owing to her rich and enduring resources both human and material. No sooner had this optimism simmered than it was swept over by the ascension of a degenerate and bankrupt indigenous leadership, which perpetually failed to transform the exploitative colonial political economy into a self-generating and self-sustaining system that would eschew inequality.